In accordance with the provisions of Article 133 of Law 39/2015, of 1 October, on the Common Administrative Procedure of Public Administrations, in relation to Article 26 of Law 50/1997, of 27 November, of the Government, with the aim of improving the participation of citizens in the procedure of elaboration of rules with rank of regulation, prior to the drafting of the articulated text of the normative draft, the present initiative is submitted to public consultation, through the web portal Ministry of Industry and Tourism, in order to obtain the opinion of the subjects and of the most representative organizations potentially affected by the future rule:

• The problems that are intended to be solved with the initiative.
• The need and opportunity for its approval.
• The objectives of the standard.

In compliance with the above and in accordance with the provisions of Order PRE/1590/2016, of 3 October, which publishes the Agreement of the Council of Ministers of 30 September 2016 issuing instructions to enable public participation in the law-making process, a period of prior public consultation is opened with respect to this draft legislation.

The manufacturing sector is responsible for 21% of the greenhouse gas emissions produced in Spain. Therefore, the acceleration of the decarbonization of the industrial sector is essential to achieve the fulfillment of the energy and climate objectives of Spain, embodied in the PNIEC 2030 and the Long Term Strategy 2050, and of the European Union. This program will allow the development of PNIEC measure 1.10 “Decarbonization of Industry”.

However, the need to accelerate the decarbonisation of the industrial sector does not only respond to climate objectives, but also to a strategic need linked to energy security and economic resilience. Although this need was already well known and, in fact, other European Union Member States have already implemented carbon difference contracts for their manufacturing industry, the war launched on 28 February 2026 following the attacks by Israel and the United States on Iran has once again highlighted the systemic risks arising from the high dependence of much of the industrial sector on fossil fuels.

In the two weeks after February 28, 2026, the spot price of natural gas (TTF) has increased 55%, exceeding 50 euros/MWh, with peaks of more than 55 euros/MWh. For oil, Brent’s barrel price has increased by 42 percent to around $100/barrel, with highs of up to $117/barrel. If the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is prolonged for a longer time, further price rises can be expected, although so far its evolution has been partially contained thanks to the release of strategic reserves by the International Energy Agency and the coverage of natural gas forward contracts.

This situation highlights the need to accelerate the energy transition of the industrial sector, by progressively abandoning the intensive use of fossil fuels in favour of renewable energies, both in the form of electricity and heat. This transition should not only be understood as a measure for mitigating climate change, but also as a key element for reducing energy dependence from abroad and, thereby, exposing the industry to the volatility of hydrocarbon markets.

In this context, Article 32 of Royal Decree-Law 7/2026, of March 20, approving the Comprehensive Plan of Response to the Crisis in the Middle East, created the Fund for the Promotion of Industrial Decarbonization (FIDI), through the modification of Title III of Royal Decree-Law 24/2020, of June 26, on social measures to reactivate employment and protect the autonomous work and competitiveness of the industrial sector.

After the modification of Title III of Royal Decree-Law 24/2020, of 26 June, on social measures for the reactivation of employment and protection of autonomous work and competitiveness of the industrial sector, it is composed of the following articles:

Article 12 establishes the constitution and purpose of the Fund for the Promotion of Industrial Decarbonization (FIDI). As a result, the FIDI is structured in 2 parts:

• Section A, intended to cover on behalf of the State the risks arising from long-term electricity supply contracts concluded by electro-intensive consumers.
• Section B, aimed at supporting the decarbonisation of energy-intensive industrial sectors, including energy-intensive consumers and other sectors with a high dependence on fossil fuels, by formalising, in particular, support instruments aimed at covering the economic risk associated with investment in low-emission industrial technologies.

For this purpose, Section B may be implemented mainly through carbon difference contracts, understood as support instruments aimed at compensating, in whole or in part, the difference between the costs of decarbonised industrial technologies and the economic signal derived from the price of carbon and energy or other market instruments, in order to facilitate investments that reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

Article 13 regulates the endowment and resources of the FIDI.

Article 14 regulates FIDI’s treasury management.

Article 15 regulates the position of managing agent for risk coverage on behalf of the State in the scope of Section A of the Fund for the Promotion of Industrial Decarbonization.

Article 15. Bis regulates the figure of the managing agent of the operations under section B of the Fund for the Promotion of Industrial Decarbonization.

Articles 12 and 15bis of Royal Decree-Law 24/2020, of June 25, require regulatory development for the determination of the characteristics and scope of the instrument of contracts for carbon difference, as well as the entity that will act as Managing Agent of the operations under section B of the FIDI.

With fully developed carbon difference contracts, a significant portion of the industry could move faster in replacing fossil fuels with technologies based on renewable electricity or other low-carbon energy sources. Consequently, the impact of episodes of energy volatility such as the current one would be expected to be less, since the direct exposure of industrial processes to the price of gas or oil would be reduced. The current situation also highlights the importance of anticipating the investment decisions needed to transform industrial processes. Investments in industrial decarbonization technologies often involve long planning, development and implementation cycles. In the absence of clear signals to facilitate such investments at the present time, there is a risk that technological transformation decisions will be postponed. In a scenario of persistence of international energy tensions and urgency in mitigating climate change, this delay could result in losses of competitiveness for certain industrial sectors, which would be forced to operate for longer with energy cost structures higher than those of their competitors and to see assets that have not yet been amortized become obsolete and trapped.

Therefore, it is essential to articulate instruments that facilitate the early adoption of low-emission industrial technologies to reduce the structural vulnerability of the industry in the face of future energy crises. In this sense, the development of contracts for carbon difference allows to accelerate the transformation of the industrial energy system, providing a stable framework that encourages private investment in more efficient production processes, less dependent on fossil fuels and, consequently, more resilient against the volatility of international energy markets.

Carbon difference contracts achieve this objective, since through them the Administration guarantees for a certain period a carbon reference price that allows investment in low-emission technologies to be viable. If the actual price of carbon in the market is lower than that level, the contract covers the difference. In this way, companies have greater security to invest in the transformation of their production processes. In addition, these contracts would provide the additional profitability necessary to undertake these projects, at least at the initial times when the payment of emission rights and energy prices do not provide sufficient incentives to undertake decarbonisation projects. The articulation of the mechanism through an auction procedure ensures greater efficiency in the allocation of public resources.

The Royal Decree will have the following general objectives:

• Regulate the characteristics and scope of the instrument of contracts for carbon difference.
• Identify the figure of managing agent of the operations under section B of the Fund for the Promotion of Industrial Decarbonization

Questions to be answered within the framework of this consultation

In order to gather as much information as possible for the proper elaboration of the normative project, the following guiding questions are asked. The answers are not mandatory, and free contributions may also be made that are considered relevant:

Question 1. Which industrial sectors should be prioritized in the first CCfD calls in Spain?

Question 2. Should the regulatory framework differentiate calls according to the temperature level required by the industrial process? In your case, what levels do you propose?

Question 3. For the Spanish context, is a bilateral (bidirectional) approach that protects the state and recovers funds if the price of CO₂ exceeds the reference price preferable, or a unilateral (unidirectional) approach where the developer simply stops receiving the aid, but retains the additional benefits?

Question 4. What mechanisms for indexing or dynamically adjusting the carbon reference price should be introduced to reflect the volatility of operating costs (OPEX)?

Question 5. Should the allocation of CCfDs be made exclusively through competitive auctions in price per tonne of CO₂ equivalent avoided, or should non-price criteria (such as impact on local employment or technological maturity) be included?

Question 6. What do you think the optimal duration of the contracts should be (e.g. 10, 15 or 20 years) to ensure the amortization of investments in clean technologies without over-compromising public funds in the long term?

Question 7: How should the system of financial guarantees required of successful tenderers be structured in order to avoid speculation and ensure that the projects awarded reach the commercial operation phase within the deadlines envisaged?

Only those responses in which the sender is identified will be considered.

In general, the contributions received will be considered to be open to public dissemination. The parts of the information submitted that, in the opinion of the interested party, should be treated confidentially and therefore should not be freely disseminated, should be specifically indicated in the text of the contribution itself, not considering for this purpose the generic messages of confidentiality of the information.